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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20040059-CA

vs.
ERNESTO ALVEREZ,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
* ie if

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a conviction for unlawful possession of controlled substance
with intent to distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(l)(a)(iii) (Supp. 2003). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)
(2002).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Did the officers' questioning of defendant about drugs occur during a level-one
consensual encounter where they approached him as he walked to his car and did not use
physical force or any show of authority to restrain his liberty?
2. Was it reasonable for the officers to grab defendant by the arms, bend him
forward, and order him to spit out the drugs after defendant attempted to swallow the drugs?

Standard ofReview. This Court reviews for clear error the factual findings underlying
a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress. State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, f
8, 6 P.3d 1133. The Court "review[s] the trial court's conclusions of law based on these
findings for correctness, with a measure of discretion given to the trial judge's application of
the legal standard to the facts." Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
U.S. Const amend. IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS

Defendant was charged with two counts of unlawful possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute, second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
58-37-8(1 )(a)(iii) (Supp. 2003). R. 1-2. After holding a preliminary hearing, a magistrate
bound defendant over for trial on both charges. R. 25-26. Defendant thereafter moved to
suppress the evidence. R. 32-33. Following an evidentiary hearing,,the trial court denied
defendant's motion. R. 42-46. This Court denied defendant's petition for interlocutory
appeal. R. 58. Thereafter, defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of
unlawful possession with intent to distribute and the other count was dismissed. R. 62-69.
Defendant reserved his right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. R.
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67. The trial court sentenced defendant to a prison term of one-to-fifteen years, suspended
the prison term, and required that he spend 30 days in jail pending release to the Immigration
and Naturalization Service. R. 70-71. Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal. R. 73-74.
SUMMARY OF FACTS

Salt Lake City police received a call from a woman reporting "drug sales near her
place." R. 88: 3-4,9-10. Police also received information regarding a particular vehicle that
was involved in the suspected drug deals. R. 88:4,9. As Officer Don Wahlin surveilled the
area in response to the report, he observed the suspect vehicle pull into a condominium
complex on the street. R. 88: 3-4,10.* Defendant exited the vehicle, entered the complex,
returned to his car five minutes later, and left. R. 88: 4, 10. Officer Wahlin had hoped to
stop defendant at that time on a traffic violation, but the opportunity did not materialize. R.
88: 10-11.2
Because defendant's short stay was consistent with a drug transaction and persons
who deal drugs typically frequent the same location, Officer Wahlin, accompanied by
Sergeant Chad Steed, returned to surveil the area the next day. R. 88: 4, 10, 12-15, 21.
Defendant returned to the complex in the same vehicle, parked in the same area, exited the

1

The State has chosen to spell the officer's surname "Wahlin," which is consistent
with the trial court's factual findings, see R. 44-45, rather than "Walling," as spelled by the
court reporter in the suppression hearing transcript. The spelling used by the trial court is
consistent with documents generated by the police department, see R. 2, 10, and the
prosecutor, see R. 35.
Although Officer Wahlin ran a computer check revealing that the car defendant was
driving was not insured, the police department had a standing policy not to initiate traffic
stops based on computer information of no insurance. R. 88: 10-12, 18-19.
3

vehicle, and entered the complex. R. 88: 4, 21. After parking their car near the suspect
vehicle, the officers exited their car and walked up to the suspect vehicle, where they waited
for defendant to return. R. 88:4-5,15,21. Sergeant Steed looked inside defendant's vehicle
and observed a facsimile of Jesus Malverde, understood in the drug culture as the patron
saint of drug dealing. Less than five minutes later, defendant returned to his car. R. 88: 5-6,
29. When defendant walked around the van that was parked next to his vehicle, the two
officers approached him to speak with him. R. 88: 6, 15.
Officer Wahlin asked defendant whether he knew that his vehicle was uninsured. R.
88: 6, 15-16. After defendant asked how he knew that, Officer Wahlin told defendant that
his vehicle was suspected of being "involved in some drug deal activities." R. 88: 6, 16.
Defendant responded that he "knew nothing of that." R. 88: 6, 16. Officer Wahlin asked
defendant whether he had any drugs on his person, which defendant denied. R. 88: 6,16,29.
Because those dealing drugs often transport them in balloons carried in their mouth, Officer
Wahlin asked defendant "if he minded opening up his mouth to show [him] he didn't have
any drugs in his mouth." R. 88: 6.4 On asking the question, defendant became nervous and
appeared to move his tongue inside his mouth in an attempt to move objects that appeared to
be "in the pit of his lip area" and swallow them. R. 88: 7, 17-18, 30. The officers
immediately grabbed defendant in a wrist lock, bent him forward to prevent him from

3

Sergeant Steed was able to recognize the image based on training and interviews he
has conducted. R. 88: 21-22.
4

Officer Wahlin confirmed that it was standard procedure to ask those suspected of
drug dealing whether they have anything in their mouth. R. 88: 18.
4

swallowing, and told him to spit out what he had in his mouth. R. 88: 7-8,30-31. Defendant
spit out fifteen balloons containing illegal narcotics. R. 45; R. 88: 8,31. Officer Wahlin did
not observe defendant chewing or see anything in his mouth before he asked the question. R.
88: 19.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The officers' questioning of defendant about drugs did not implicate the Fourth
Amendment because the questioning occurred during the course of a consensual encounter.
Even assuming arguendo that defendant was detained, the officers had reasonable suspicion
to question defendant about drugs. The officers were aware of a report that defendant's car
was involved in selling drugs and that drug sales were occurring in the area where defendant
visited. The officers observed defendant make two short-term visits that were consistent
with drug dealing. Moreover, a facsimile of the patron saint of drug dealing was observed in
defendant's car. These facts established reasonable suspicion.
The officers' suspicion raised to the level of probable cause when, in response to a
request that he open his mouth, defendant became nervous and began manipulating objects in
his mouth and begin to swallow them. The officers, based on their training and experience,
immediately recognized that defendant was attempting to swallow drugs, a common practice
among drug dealers. Defendant's attempt to conceal or destroy the contraband created an
exigency justifying a warrantless search. Finally, the force used by the officers in grabbing
defendant by the arm and bending him forward was reasonable.

5

ARGUMENT
I.

THE OFFICERS' QUESTIONING OF DEFENDANT ABOUT DRUGS
DID NOT IMPLICATE THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Utah courts have recognized three levels of constitutionally permissible encounters

between police officers and the public: "(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime
[sic] and pose questions so long as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer
may [temporarily] seize a person if the officer has an "articulable suspicion" that the person
has committed or is about to commit a crime;. .. [and] (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if
the officer has probable cause to believe an offense has been committed or is being
committed." State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (per curiam) (citations
omitted); accord Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55, f 10, 998 P.2d 274. Officers
Wahlin and Steed acted within the parameters of constitutionally permissible conduct.
A.

THE OFFICERS' QUESTIONING OF DEFENDANT OCCURRED DURING A
LEVEL-ONE CONSENSUAL ENCOUNTER

Defendant claims that the officers' initial approach and questioning of him constituted
a level-two investigatory detention requiring reasonable suspicion. Aplt. Brf. at 12-16.
Defendant acknowledges that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant and
question him about a lack of insurance. Aplt. Brf. at 17. However, he argues that the
officers' inquiries about drugs was not supported by reasonable suspicion and thus exceeded
the scope of the stop. Aplt. Brf. at 16-29. Defendant's claim fails at the outset because the
officers' questioning of defendant occurred during the course of a level-one consensual
encounter.

6

"A level one citizen encounter with a law enforcement official is a consensual
encounter wherein a citizen voluntarily responds to non-coercive questioning by an officer."
State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, f 34, 63 P.3d 650 {Hansen II). Because "the encounter is
consensual, and the person is free to leave at any point, there is no seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Id. In contrast, "[a] level two encounter involves an
investigative detention [or seizure] that is usually characterized as brief and non-intrusive."
Id. at Tf 35. The United States Supreme Court has explained that "a person has been 'seized'
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he [or she] was not
free to leave." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877
(1980).
Seizure is marked by police use "of physical force or a show of authority" such that
the person's "freedom of movement is restrained."

Id. at 553, 100 S.Ct. at 1877.

Circumstances suggestive of a seizure include: "the threatening presence of several officers,
the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen,
[and] the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's
request might be compelled." Id. at 554,100 S.Ct. at 1877; accord Hansen II, 2002 UT 125,
^| 41. A seizure is likely to be found if the officer activates his overhead red-and-blue lights,
see Hansen II, 2002 UT 125,ffif37,44, blocks a defendant's egress, State v. Struhs, 940 P.2d
1225, 1228 (Utah App. 1997), or demands or retains "a person's identification or other
important papers," Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55, f 14, 998 P.2d 274.

7

A review of the foregoing factors and "all of the [other] circumstances surrounding
the incident" reveals that defendant was not detained during the questioning.

See

Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 100 S.Ct. at 1877. The evidence established that after
defendant parked his car and walked into the condominium complex, the officers "moved
[their unmarked] car up close to where [defendant's] vehicle was parked." R. 88: 4,15,21,
31. Both officers exited their car to await defendant's return. R. 88: 4, 15, 21, 31-32. The
officers approached defendant's car and waited behind a van that was parked next to
defendant's vehicle. R. 88: 5-6, 21. Less than five minutes later, defendant "came around
the van," whereupon the officers "approached him to talk with him." R. 88: 5-6, 15.
The foregoing facts were not indicative of a seizure. The officers did not display their
weapons, touch defendant, or use language or a tone of voice indicating that defendant was
required to remain and speak with them. They did not activate their overhead red-and-blue
lights, block defendant's egress, or retain defendant's identification.

Although two

uniformed officers approached defendant, nothing in the record suggests that they did so in a
threatening or confrontational manner. They waited for him to return to his car, and when he
did, they "startfed] talking to him." R. 88: 15. In short, nothing in their conduct would have
suggested to a reasonable person that defendant was not "free cto disregard [them] and go
about his business.'" Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2386 (1991)
(quoting California v. HodariD., 499 U.S. 621, 628, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 1552 (1991)).
In arguing that he was seized, Defendant cites: (1) the officers' failure to resolve the
allegation of no insurance; (2) the alleged stealthy and confrontational approach of the
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officers; and (3) the accusatory nature of the officers' questions. Aplt. Brf. at 14-15. None
of these factors support a finding that defendant was seized.
Citing State v. Hansen, 2002 UT App 353, f 15,17 P.3d 1135, ajf'd, 2002 UT 125,63
P.3d 650 (Hansen 7), defendant contends that the officer's failure to resolve his assertion that
defendant's vehicle was uninsured is indicative of a seizure. Aplt. Brf. at 15. Hansen I,
however, considered whether a level-two detention de-escalated to a level-one consensual
encounter. The issue was whether the routine traffic stop for an illegal lane change and no
insurance de-escalated to a voluntary encounter where the officer failed to resolve the illegal
lane change allegation. Hansen I, 2000 UT App 353,fflf8-16. In that context, the court of
appeals concluded that the traffic stop had not de-escalated to a voluntary encounter because
the officer "had not addressed one of the reasons [he gave] for the initial stop." Id. at f 15.
In affirming the court of appeals' decision, the Utah Supreme Court explained that a
reasonable person under those circumstances would not believe the stop had terminated until
all of the alleged violations had been addressed. Hansen II, 2002 UT 125, at f 45.
Defendant also maintains that the officers "used a 'stealthy approach' in confronting
[him]," alleging that they "stepped out of their hiding place [behind the van] and 'came
around the van' intercepting [his] path as he attempted to approach the vehicle." Aplt. Brf. at
14. Defendant misstates the facts. While it is true that the officers waited for defendant
behind the van, the record does not support defendant's claim that the officers "'came around
the van'" and "intercepted] [defendant's] path as he attempted to approach the vehicle."
Aplt. Brf. at 14 (emphases added). Rather, Officer Wahlin testified that "when the defendant

9

came around the van, that's when [the officers] approached him to talk with him." R. 6
(emphasis added). This testimony does not indicate that they "intercepted]" defendant's
path or otherwise "confronted" him, nor did defendant present any testimony so indicating.
See ApltBrf. at 14-15.
Moreover, the officers' position behind the van and their approach to defendant after
he "came around the van" in no way approximated the stealthy, sudden, and confrontational
approach to which this Court referred in State v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225 (Utah App. 1997). In
that case, an officer on night patrol observed defendant drive his pickup truck down a road
that was under repair, park next to barricades and a sign that read "Road Closed," and turn
off the truck's lights. Struhs, 940 P.2d at 1226. Suspicious of defendant's activity, the
officer turned off all the lights of her patrol car, drove up to defendant's truck—parking
about "a car length-and-a-half in front of defendant's truck in a posture she described as
c

nose-to-nose"—and "activated her high-beam headlights and the white 'takedown' light

. .. ." Id. This Court concluded that "[t]he time of night, the isolation of the location, the
confrontational approach made by the officer, the officer parking nose-to-nose with
defendant's vehicle, and the officer's sudden activation of her high-beam headlights and
white take-down lights" supported a finding that the defendant was detained. Id. at 1228.
Iti contrast, the officers here did not sneak up on defendant, block his egress, or
suddenly activate any lights. Moreover, the encounter did not occur in an isolated location at
night, but in the parking lot of a condominium complex in the afternoon. See R. 10; R. 88:
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3-4.5 Although the officers stood behind the van while waiting for defendant, see R. 88: 32,
nothing in the record suggests that they took defendant by surprise or were in any way
confrontational, as in Struhs.
Finally, defendant complains that the officers "subjected [him] to accusatory
questions [about drugs] that indicated he was suspected of being engaged in illegal activity."
Aplt. Brf. at 15. Officer Wahlin did explain to defendant that his vehicle "had been
suspected of being . . . involved in some drug dealing activities," ask him "if he had any
drugs on his person," and ask "if he minded opening up his mouth to show [that] he didn't
have any drugs in his mouth." R. 88: 6. Mere questioning, however, even if investigative in
nature, does not convert an otherwise consensual encounter into a seizure.
Citing Hansen /, defendant argues that "accusatory or investigatory questions that
indicate the individual is suspected of being 'engaged in some sort of illegal activity'" is
indicative of an illegal seizure. Aplt. Brf. at 14. As noted, however, Hansen I considered
whether a level-two detention de-escalated to a level-one consensual encounter. Hansen /,
2000 UT App 353, atffi[8-16. In that context, the court of appeals held that "investigatory
questions [unrelated to the purpose of the initial stop] actually cut against the proposition that
a reasonable person would feel that the initial seizure has ended. . . ." Id. at f 14 (emphasis
added). This is so because unrelated questioning on the heels of a legitimate detention does

5

The officers did not testify at one time of day the arrest was made on June 24,2003.
However, the booking sheet, which was entered in the record on June 26, 2003, indicated
that defendant was arrested at 3:30 p.m. and booked into jail at 5:06 p.m. See R. 10.
11

not "'change the climate [of the encounter] so that the reasonable listener would view
participation in the exchange as freely terminable."5 Id. (quoting United States v. Sandoval,
29 F.3d 537, 542 (10th Cir. 1994). The holding in Hansen I, therefore, does not apply
because the issue here does not involve a claim of de-escalation.
This Court has held that a "statement[ ] by police that an investigation has focused on
the individual" is a factor in evaluating the nature of an encounter. State v. Carter, 812 P.2d
460,463 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (1992).7 That holding, however, is
inconsistent with holdings of the United States Supreme Court.
The United States Supreme Court has time and again emphasized that "even when
officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask
questions of that individual, ask to examine the individual's identification, and [even]
request consent to search his or her luggage—as long as the police do not convey a message
that compliance with their requests is required." Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35, 111 S.Ct. at
2386 (emphasis added). That such questioning is investigatory is not relevant to the issue.
The Supreme Court has long "endorsed" the proposition that police officers can approach
individuals as to whom they have no reasonable suspicion and ask them potentially
incriminating questions." Id. at 439, 111 S.Ct. at 2388 (emphasis added). "While most

6

For the same reason, whether or not the officer pursued or resolved the no insurance
issue is likewise irrelevant in determining whether an initial encounter constitutes a stop.
7

The court of appeals in Hansen I also cited a Washington decision that treated
investigatory questioning as indicative of a seizure. See Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, at Tf 14
(citing Washington v. Soto-Garcia, 841 P.2d 1271, 1273-74 (Wash. App. 1992)).
12

citizens [may very well] respond to a police request, the fact that people do so, and do so
without being told they are free not to respond, hardly eliminates the consensual nature of the
response." IKS. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216, 104 S.Ct 1758, 1762 (1984).
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in IN.S. v. Delgado is instructive.
In that case, agents of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) conducted three
"factory surveys" in search of illegal aliens. Delgado, 466 U.S at 212, 104 S.Ct. at 1760.
With several INS agents positioned near the factory exits, other agents systematically
questioned most, but not all, employees at their work stations. Id. The agents, who were
armed and displayed badges, asked the employees one to three questions relating to their
citizenship. Id. "If the employee gave a credible reply that he was a United States citizen,
the questioning ended, and the agent moved on to another employee." Id. On the other hand,
"[i]f the employee gave an unsatisfactory response or admitted that he was an alien, the
employee was asked to produce his immigration papers." Id. at 212-13,104 S.Ct. 1760. The
agents arrested those they had probable cause to believe were illegal aliens. Id. at 218,104
S.Ct. at 1763-64.
The federal court of appeals concluded that the employees were seized under the
Fourth Amendment based on the stationing of the INS agents near the exits, the surprise
element of the unannounced intrusion, the systematic questioning of the employees, the
length of the survey, and the failure to advise employees they were free to leave. See id. at
217,104 S.Ct. at 1763. The United States Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 221,104 S.Ct. at
1765. Noting that the employees were free to move about the factory, and that no one was
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actually prevented from leaving the buildings, the Supreme Court concluded that the agents'
conduct "should have given [the respondent employees] no reason to believe that they would
be detained if they gave truthful answers to the questions put to them or if they simply
refused to answer." /J. at 218,104 S.Ct. at 1764. The Court further held that "[t]he manner
in which [the respondent employees] were questioned, given its obvious purpose [to verify
their citizenship and right to work], could hardly result in a reasonable fear that respondents
were not free to continue working or to move about the factory." Id. at 220-21,104 S.Ct. at
1765.
The questioning by INS agents in Delgado was clearly investigatory in nature and
designed to apprehend illegal aliens. The questioning was systematically conducted by
multiple armed INS agents with other agents stationed near the exits. Yet, the Supreme
Court found no seizure. The circumstances in this case were far less threatening. Although
Officer Wahlin's questions were investigative in nature, there was no show of authority
indicating that defendant was not free to leave or otherwise go about his business. The
officers simply approached defendant when he walked around the van and asked him a few
questions. It cannot be said under these circumstances that the conduct of Officers Wahlin
and Steed was "so intimidating as to demonstrate that a reasonable person would have
believed that he was not free to leave ifhe had not responded." i#.at216,104S.C1 atl762.
B.

IN ANY EVENT, THE OFFICERS HAD REASONABLE SUSPICION TO
QUESTION DEFENDANT ABOUT DRUGS

Even assuming arguendo that defendant was detained during the officers5 questioning
about drugs, the detention was supported by reasonable suspicion.
14

"In determining whether a . . . seizure is constitutionally reasonable, [the court] makes
a dual inquiry: (1) Was the police officer's action 'justified at it's inception'? and (2) Was
the resulting detention 'reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the
interference in the first place'?" State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131-32 (Utah 1994)
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879 (1968)). A stop is justified
"if the officer's action is supported by reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity
'"may be afoot.'"" United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 750 (2002)
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868) (other citations omitted)). However, "[o]nce
the purpose of the initial stop is concluded, . . . the person must be allowed to depart."
Hansen II, 2002 UT 125, at Tj 31. Further detention is justified only if the officer "has
probable cause or a reasonable suspicion of a further illegality." Id.
Defendant acknowledges that Officer Wahlin had reasonable suspicion to stop him
based on a computer check indicating that his vehicle was not insured. Aplt. Brf. at 4,17. 8
He contends, however, that the officer's questions about drugs exceeded the permissible
scope of the alleged stop. Aplt. Brf. at 17-18. Where defendant concedes that the alleged
detention was justified at its inception, the only issue is whether the officers had a reasonable
suspicion that defendant was selling or buying drugs. See Hansen II, 2002 UT 125, at ^f 31
(holding that further detention is justified if officer "has probable cause or a reasonable
suspicion of a further illegality"). A review of the record reveals that they did.

Utah law makes it a class B misdemeanor for a driver to knowingly operate an
uninsured motor vehicle on the highways of the state. Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-302 (1998).
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An investigatory detention may not be based on "inarticulate hunches." See id. at 22,
88 S.Ct. at 1880. The officer must be able to identify "specific and articulable facts which,
taken together with rational inferences from those facts," support a reasonable suspicion that
"criminal activity may be afoot." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880,
1884 (1968); accord State v. Kohl, 2002 UT 35, f 11, 999 P.3d 7. "Although an officer's
reliance on a mere 'hunch' is insufficient to justify a stop, the likelihood of criminal activity
need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of
satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard." United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,
274,122 S.Ct. 744, 751 (2002). Accordingly, "[a] determination that reasonable suspicion
exists .. . need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct." Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277,
122 S.Ct. at 753.
Defendant contends that the narcotics intelligence report that defendant's vehicle was
suspected of being involved in drug sales "was insufficient to support a reasonable suspicion
that [defendant] was engaged in criminal activity." Aplt. Brf. at 26. He complains that the
State did not identify the person who provided the tip, explain how the informant knew about
the drug sales, or corroborate the tip. Aplt. Brf. at 20-26. Had the narcotics intelligence
report been the only fact to justify the alleged stop, defendant's argument might have merit.
That, however, was not the case.
Officer Wahlin testified that he suspected defendant of dealing drugs based on the
following facts: (1) a narcotics intelligence report indicated that the car defendant was
driving was suspected of being involved in "dealing drugs," R. 88:3,9-10,30; (2) defendant
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drove that car into the parking lot of a condominium complex located at 2450 South
Elizabeth Street, R. 88: 3-4, 10; (3) the officers had information that drugs were being sold
"in the Elizabeth Street area of that south," R. 88: 9;9 (4) defendant exited the car, entered the
complex, returned five minutes later, and left, R. 88: 4, 10; (5) defendant returned to the
condominiums the following day at approximately the same time in the same car, parking in
approximately the same place, R. 88: 4, 21; (6) defendant again exited the car, entered the
complex, and returned to his car less than five minutes later, R. 88: 4-5, 21; (7) defendant's
short-term stays at the complex were consistent with drug transactions, R. 88: 10;10 (8) in
Officer Wahlin's experience and consistent with his training, drug dealers often frequent the
same location at approximately the same time of day, R. 88: 15; (9) Sgt. Steed observed in
defendant's car a facsimile of Jesus Malverde, which he recognized through training and
interviews as "the patron saint of drug dealing," R. 88: 21-22; and (10) Sgt. Steed observed
in defendant's car a small bottle of water, which drug traffickers often carry to swallow
drugs they transport in their mouths, R. 347: 88:29. These facts were more than sufficient to
support a reasonable suspicion that defendant was selling or buying drugs at the complex.
Defendant attempts to dismiss each of these facts as insignificant. Aplt. Brf. at 19
(arguing that water bottle and Jesus Malverde facsimile not significant), 20-26 (arguing that

9

Though the record is not entirely clear, the information regarding sales in the area of
the condominiums appears to have also come from the intelligence report. See R. 88: 9-10.
10

Officer Wahlin confirmed that defendant's short term visit was consistent with a
"drug transaction taking place" during cross-examination. R. 88:10. Defense counsel never
challenged that conclusion. See R. 88: 10, 34-37.
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intelligence report was insufficient to support reasonable suspicion), 27-29 (arguing that
purpose of short term stays was not determined). In doing so, however, he engages in the
"divide-and-conquer analysis" which Terry and its progeny condemn. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at
274,122 S.Ct. at 751. "The totality of the circumstances analysis objectively evaluates all
facts before the officer at the time the officer made the decision." State v. Warren, 2003 UT
36, f 21,78 P.3d 590 (emphasis added). The "evaluation... of [facts] in isolation from each
other does not take into account the 'totality of the circumstances,5" as required under Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274,122 S.Ct. at 751. The Court, therefore,
"must view the facts in their totality and avoid the temptation to divide the facts and evaluate
them in isolation from each other." Id. at ^f 14. In other words, the totality of the
circumstances analysis is not a process of elimination, but of accretion.
The narcotics intelligence report, standing alone, does not support a finding of
reasonable suspicion. Defendant's trip to the area where drugs sales were reported does not,
standing alone, establish reasonable suspicion. Defendant's short-term stay does not,
standing alone, support reasonable suspicion. Defendant's return the following day at
approximately the same time does not, standing alone, support reasonable suspicion. Nor
does the second short-term stay. The Jesus Malverde facsimile does not, standing alone,
establish reasonable suspicion. Nor does the small bottle of water. Indeed, none of these
facts, standing alone, established reasonable suspicion. When added together, however, they
supported a reasonable inference that "criminal activity may be afoot." Terry, 392 U.S. at
30, 88 S.Ct. at 1884.
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The trial court was also warranted in considering the officers' assessment of the facts
in light of their training and experience. Indeed, "[t]he officer, with training and experience,
is in the best position to evaluate the circumstances and determine the reasonableness" of a
particular search or seizure. State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36,121,78 P.3d 590. Accordingly,
the officers' subjective assessment of the facts, based on their experience and training, may
also weigh in favor of a finding of reasonable suspicion. See id. atfflf20-21. While similarly
timed visits, short-term stays, water bottles, and Jesus Malverde facsimiles may mean
nothing to the ordinary citizen or legal technician, the reasonable suspicion analysis "allows
officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from
and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that 'might well elude an
untrained person.'" Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273, 122 S.Ct. at 750-51 (emphasis added).
Defendant relies in part on this Court's decision in State v. Sykes, 840 P.2d 825 (Utah
App. 1992), which reversed the trial court's denial of a motion to suppress. That case,
however, is distinguishable.
In Sykes, the officer stopped defendant after observing her drive up to a house under
surveillance, enter the house, and leave some three minutes later. Id. at 826. The house was
under surveillance because (1) neighbors had complained that people were entering and
leaving the house at all hours, (2) a confidential informant had provided "unspecified
information, and (3) the officer had purchased cocaine in the general area. Id. at 828. The
facts here are readily distinguishable. The complaint in Sykes did not directly allege criminal
wrongdoing, complaining only of people coming in an out of the house. And although the
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officer had information from a confidential informant, the content of that information was
not disclosed to the court. In contrast, the officers here received reports that someone was
selling drugs in the area they were surveying and that defendant's vehicle was involved in
drug sales. Moreover, the police in Sykes "had no positive evidence linking the house to
illegal activity." Id. at 828-29. In contrast, defendant's vehicle contained a facsimile of
Jesus Malverde, the patron saint of drug dealing. Finally, the officers in Sykes observed only
one short term visit. Id. at 829. On the other hand, the officers here observed two short term
visits which occurred at roughly the same time of day in the same area, thus confirming a
pattern of activity by defendant that was consistent with drug sales.
* * *

In summary, the officers' questioning of defendant did not implicate the Fourth
Amendment because it occurred during a level-one consensual encounter. Assuming
arguendo that defendant was seized, the alleged seizure was supported by reasonable
suspicion.
II.

THE OFFICERS WERE JUSTIFIED IN DETAINING DEFENDANT
AND ORDERING HIM TO SPIT OUT THE CONTRABAND
In his second point on appeal, defendant contends that the officers were not, in any

event, justified in "forcibly conducting] a warrantless search of his person without the
necessary showing of exigent circumstances" when defendant attempted to swallow the
contraband. Aplt. Brf. at 30. This claim likewise fails.
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Once both officers grabbed defendant by the arms in a wrist lock and bent him
forward, defendant was seized under the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, because the
purpose of the seizure was to prevent defendant from swallowing and to retrieve the drugs,
their actions constituted a warrantless search.
In State v. Hodson, 866 P.2d 556, (Utah App. 1993), rev 9d on other grounds, 907 P.2d
1155 (Utah 1995) {Hodson 7), this Court set forth a three-part test in determining whether a
warrantless "body" search is reasonable. The State must demonstrate: (1) "probable cause to
believe that evidence will be found" in the body search; (2) exigent circumstances justifying
the search; and (3) "the method chosen was a reasonable one, performed in a reasonable
manner." Id. at 560 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768-72, 86 S.Ct. 1826,
1834-36 (1966)). The officers' search of defendant here satisfied all three prongs.
A.

T H E OFFICERS HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT DEFENDANT
W A S CONCEALING DRUGS IN H I S MOUTH

As noted, the first prong of the "Schmerber" test requires the State to demonstrate that
there was "probable cause to believe that evidence w[ould] be found" in the body search. Id.
Stated another way, there must be a "clear indication" that evidence will be found. Id. Like
reasonable suspicion, "[t]he determination of whether probable cause exists . . . depends
upon an examination of all the information available to the searching officer in light of the
circumstances as they existed at the time the search was made.'" Id. (quoting State v.
Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1986)).
As explained above, the officers were justified initially in stopping defendant (though
they did not) and questioning him concerning their suspicions. Defendant's behavior
21

following the questioning was sufficient, in light of the other information, to establish
probable cause to believe he was concealing drugs in his mouth.
After Officer Wahlin asked if he could check defendant's mouth for drugs, he
observed what appeared to be defendant's tongue moving objects inside his mouth and
swallowing or attempting to swallow those objects. R. 88: 7, 19, 30. Both officers
immediately recognized this as an attempt to swallow drugs. R. 88: 7-8, 17, 31. Officer
Wahlin explained that based on his training and experience, drug dealers "typically" package
drugs in balloons and conceal them in their mouths so they can swallow them if they are
approached by police. R. 88: 6. This Court has likewise recognized that "a reasonable
officer would know that it is a common practice among drug dealers to swallow the evidence
if the police arrive on the scene." Hodson /, 866 P.2d at 560.
In addition, Officer Wahlin noticed that after asking defendant if he could check his
mouth for drugs, he became nervous. R. 88: 18. While nervousness alone is insufficient to
establish probable cause, "it may . . . be considered in conjunction with other relevant and
objective facts." State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 541 (Utah App. 1997). In this case,
defendant's nervousness was highly relevant because defendant did not become nervous
until after Officer Wahlin asked if he could check his mouth for drugs.
Defendant contends that Officer Wahlin could not have probable cause because he
testified that during the initial questioning, he did not see anything in defendant's mouth or
notice any mumbling. Aplt. Brf at 33. However, the fact that the officer did not initially
observe anything in defendant's mouth, but could later discern that defendant had something

22

in his mouth and was trying to swallow it, suggests that defendant was hiding contraband
from the outset. If it was anything other than contraband, defendant would have no reason to
conceal it. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "nervous, evasive behavior
is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion/' Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119,
124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 676 (2000), and thus probable cause.

As held by this Court,

"'deliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of. . . law officers are strong indicia
of mens rea, and when coupled with specific knowledge on the part of the officer relating the
suspect to evidence of crime, they are proper factors to be considered in the decision to make
an arrest."5 Hodson /, 866 P.2d at 560 (citations omitted).
In summary, the report of drug activity involving defendant's car in the area of the
condominium complex, defendant's pattern of short-term visits at the same place and at
approximately the same time, and the Jesus Malverde facsimile in his car, combined with
defendant's nervous behavior after the questioning, and his attempt to swallow previously
concealed objects in his mouth, established probable cause to believe defendant was
concealing contraband in his mouth. Moreover, due weight should be given to the officers'
subjective assessment of these facts, given their training and experience in detecting drug
violations. See Warren, 2003 UT 36, at f 21. Indeed, it is particularly telling that both
officers, without communicating with the other, immediately recognized defendant's actions
as an attempt to swallow contraband. See R. 88: 7,17,30 (Sgt. Steed testifying that they did
not talk about grabbing defendant at all, but that "[i]t just happened" because he concluded
defendant "was going to swallow drugs").
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B.

EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFIED THE OFFICERS' ACTIONS

Under the second prong of the analysis, the State must establish the existence of
exigent circumstances. Hodson /, 866 P.2d at 561. This Court has explained that "[ejxigent
circumstances are those 'that would cause a reasonable person to believe that [a search or
seizure] .. . was necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, the
destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other consequence
improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts."5 State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9,18
(Utah App. 1993) (citations omitted) (ellipses in original); accord Hodson /, 866 P.2d at 561.
In this case, the officers' immediate retrieval of the contraband was necessary to
prevent not only the possible loss of the evidence, but also to prevent possible harm to
defendant. This Court so held under similar circumstances in Hodson I. 866 P.2d at 561.
Even though the officers had probable cause to believe defendant was carrying the drugs in
balloons, they could not be sure of that fact, nor could they be confident that the packaging
was secure. As observed by this Court in Hodson /, "[w]hen illegal drugs are ingested to
conceal them from law enforcement, a reasonable police officer cannot know, for certain, the
method of packaging the drug." Hodson /, 866 P.2d at 561. As a result, the Court reasoned,
"it is not unreasonable [for officers] to assume the drug might not be securely packaged so as
to avoid its dissipation in the ingester's system, with resulting probable toxic effects." Id.
Nor should officers be required to stand idly by as a suspect takes steps to conceal or
destroy evidence, even if police might be able to retrieve that evidence later through other
means. United States v. Holloway, 906 F.Supp. 1437, 1443 (D. Kan. 1995) (holding that
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"[ojfficers [are] not required to simply wait to let nature take its course"). In People v.
Bracamonte, 540 P.2d 624, 532 (Cal. 1975), upon which defendant heavily relies, see Aplt.
Brf. at 39-40 n.6, the California Supreme Court observed that "the mouth is not a sacred
orifice and there is no constitutional right to destroy or dispose of evidence." As a result, the
court concluded, "attempts to swallow evidence can be prevented" by police. Id.
Defendant contends, however, that the potential loss of evidence or risk of harm to the
swallower do not constitute exigent circumstances because the drugs could be retrieved after
they passed through defendant's digestive system or could be identified through chemical
analysis if the drugs were absorbed into defendant's bloodstream. See Aplt. Brf. at 37-41. In
support of his claim, defendant relies on State v. Hodson, 907 P.2d 1155, 1158 (Utah 1995)
{Hodson II), which reversed the Hods on I conclusion that the force used in that case to
obtain the drugs was reasonable. The Hodson //holding upon which defendant relies does
not, however, support his claim.
In Hodson, Officers Smith and Garcia initiated a stop of defendant in his vehicle after
he completed a sale of heroin to a police informant. Hodson II, 907 P.2d at 1156. As the
two officers approached defendant, they observed him throw something in his mouth. Id.
After defendant stopped, the officers immediately exited their vehicle, ran up to defendant,
"grabbed him by the cheeks, held a gun to the side of his face, and ordered him to cspit it
out.'" Id. When he did not comply, Officer Garcia placed his gun on the hood of the car and
pulled defendant out of the car as Officer Smith opened the door. Id. Officer Garcia placed
his arm around defendant's neck and again ordered him to spit out the drugs. Id. Defendant
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spit out some plastic heroin chips and Officer Garcia retrieved more chips by inserting his
finger in defendant's mouth. Id. Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence was denied.
On appeal, this Court examined the search under the three-part Schmerber test.
Hodson II, 866 P.2d at 560. The Court found both probable cause and exigent circumstances
to justify the warrantless search. Id. at 560-61. In assessing the reasonableness of the force
used on defendant, the Court adopted a standard that makes it "constitutionally reasonable
for the police to place their hands on a suspect's throat to prevent the swallowing of
evidence, as long as they do not choke him [or her], i.e., prevent him [or her] from breathing
or obstruct the blood supply to [the] head." Id. at 563 (quotes and citations omitted)
(brackets in original). Because no testimony was elicited on this issue, the Court remanded
to the trial court for further findings. Id. The Court held that the officer's use of the gun,
without an express threat to kill defendant, was reasonable. Id.
On certiorari, the Utah Supreme Court reversed and ordered suppression of the
evidence. Hodson II, 907 P.2d at 1160. The Supreme Court did not, however, address or
otherwise disturb the court of appeals' conclusions of probable cause and exigent
circumstances. Instead, the Court examined the court of appeals' holding regarding the
reasonableness of the force officers used to retrieve the evidence. Id. at 1156. In doing so,
the Court applied the three-part test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753,105 S.Ct. 1611 (1985). The Court held that under the Winston
test, "the reasonableness of force used in a search [must] be measured against (1) the extent
to which the procedure used may threaten the safety or health of the individual, (2) the extent
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of the intrusion upon the individual's dignitary interests in personal privacy and bodily
integrity, and (3) the community's interest in fairly and accurately determining guilt or
innocence." Hodson II, 907 P.2d at 1157.
Applying the three-part test, the Supreme Court concluded that the use of the
neckhold created an "enormous risk" to the health and safety of the defendant. Id. at 1158.
The Court held that the extent of the intrusion upon the defendant's dignitary interests in
personal privacy and bodily integrity was "very high" where he was assaulted with a loaded
weapon, dragged to the ground, was subjected to a neckhold, and had fingers inserted in his
mouth. Id. The Court then examined the State's interest in preserving the evidence and
whether that interest could shift the balance. Id. The Court concluded that the State's
interest in preserving evidence did not shift the balance because nothing in the record
suggested that the evidence could not eventually be recovered. Id. The Court held that "[i]n
the absence of an urgent need to preserve evidence, there cannot be a justification for the
significant risks to health and safety posed by using the kind of force in this case to get a
suspect to spit out what is believed to be a mouthful of drugs." Id. In other words, the Court
simply concluded that the exigency was not so great as to justify a use of force at this level.
See id. (holding that "[n]o emergency or exigency justifies the use of force at [that] level to
preserve evidence which would be readily (if inconveniently) accessible through nonviolent
means"). Defendant's reliance on Hodson II, therefore, is misplaced.
In summary, the potential that the contraband would either be destroyed or cause
harm if swallowed created an exigency that justified a reasonable search.
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C.

T H E FORCE USED BY THE OFFICERS 9 IN GRABBING DEFENDANT BY THE
ARMS AND BENDING H I M FORWARD W A S REASONABLE

The third prong of the Schmerber test requires that the force used be reasonable.
Hodson /, 866 P.2d at 560. As noted, "the reasonableness of force used in a search [is]
measured against (1) the extent to which the procedure used may threaten the safety or health
of the individual, (2) the extent of the intrusion upon the individual's dignitary interests in
personal privacy and bodily integrity, and (3) the community's interest in fairly and
accurately determining guilt or innocence." Hodson II, 907 P.2d at 1157. An examination
of these factors reveals that the force used by Officers Wahlin and Steed was reasonable.
In this case, each officer grabbed defendant by an arm and wrist and bent him forward
so it was harder for him to swallow. R. 88: 8,30-31. Officer Wahlin then ordered defendant
to spit out the drugs. R. 88: 8, 31. Defendant contends that the "wrist lock" was "extremely
painful" and "created a substantial risk of him aspirating on objects in his mouth." Aplt. Brf.
at 42. These claims find no support in the record. No evidence was introduced indicating
that the officers inflicted pain. And even had defendant suffered some pain, prong one of the
Winston test considers the threat to safety or health, not pain. In this regard, no evidence was
introduced suggesting that bending defendant forward created a risk that he would aspirate
the contraband. This claim is nothing more than speculation by defendant. To the contrary,
Officer Wahlin testified that bending defendant forward made it harder for him to swallow.
R. 88: 8. In summary, therefore, the force used by the officers here did not threaten the
safety or health of defendant.
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Likewise, the intrusion on bodily integrity and dignitary interests, and the level of
intrusion, was low. Although the officers grabbed defendant by the arm and bent him
forward, they did not assault him with a loaded weapon, drag him to the ground, apply a
dangerous neckhold, or physically intrude into defendant's mouth, as in Hodson. Indeed, the
force used by Officers Wahlin and Steed is typical in any arrest.
Finally, the officers had a legitimate interest in preventing defendant from swallowing
the evidence to conceal or destroy it. As noted, Hodson //holds that police may not prevent
a suspect from swallowing contraband through a use of force that creates a substantial risk to
the health or safety of the suspect. Hodson II, 907 P.2d at 1158-59. This is so because the
government's interest in securing evidence, that might potentially be lost, does not outweigh
an individual's interest in his or her health and safety. The same cannot be said about the use
of minimal force.

Indeed, the government's interest in preventing defendant from

swallowing evidence, to prevent a potential risk to defendant's health and loss of evidence,
outweighs defendant's interest in being held by police in a manner that is not dangerous or
unduly intrusive.
In summary, the force used by the officers in this case did not threaten defendant's
health or safety or substantially intrude upon defendant's dignitary interests in personal
privacy and bodily integrity. Moreover, the interests of the government in preventing a
potential health risk to defendant and a potential loss of evidence outweighed defendant's
interest in being free from reasonable restraint.
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Where the search of defendant was supported by probable cause and exigent
circumstances, and the force used by the offices in conducting the "search" was reasonable,
the trial court correctly concluded that defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were not
violated.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm
defendant's conviction.
Respectfully submitted August 18, 2004.
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
FINDING OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
-vs-

Case No. 031904214
ERNESTO ALVAREZ,
Judge Paul G. Maughn
Defendant.
THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER CAME BEFORE the Court for hearing and
determination of the Defendant's Motion to Suppress, on August 26, 2003. The Honorable Paul G.
Maughn presided. The Defendant was present and represented by Steve Shapiro. Kimberly
McKinnon, Deputy District Attorney for Salt Lake County, represented the State. Based upon the
memorandums of law submitted and the arguments of counsel presented, and for good cause shown,
the Court now makes and enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On June 24, 2003, Sergeant Chad Steed and Officer Wahlin of the Salt Lake City Police
Department observed a vehicle under suspicion
;ion for
ior illegal activities pulling into a

J

apartment complex at 2430 S. Elizabeth Street. The officers watched the defendant enter
the complex, and then return shortly after.
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2. On the initial approach to the defendant's vehicle, Sergeant Steed observed in the center
console of the defendant's vehicle a bottle of water as well as a facsimile of "Jesus
Malverde."
3. When the defendant returned to his vehicle Officer Wahlin talked to the defendant.
During the course of the conversation, Officer Wahlin asked the defendant if he had
drugs in his mouth. At that point the defendant made swallowing motions with his
mouth. Both officers simultaneously watched as the defendant moved objects in his
mouth and tried to swallow. Officers then each physically grabbed one of the
defendant's arms and forced him to spit out the balloons containing illegal narcotics.
FROM THE FOREGOING FINDINGS OF FACT, THE COURT NOW MAKES AND

ENTERS THE FOLLOWING:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. In the totality of the circumstances, the Officers acted reasonably.
2. The defendant did not open his mouth and officers clearly observed a crime being
committed in their immediate presence.
3. Given the circumstances, a search warrant was not needed.
4. The Defendant's Motion to Suppress Illegally Obtained Evidence is Denied.

DATED this

7

day of
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DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
KIMBERLY MCKTNNON, 8826
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
-vsCase No. 031904214
ERNESTO ALVAREZ,
Judge Paul G. MaughaA/
Defendant.
Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby ORDERED,
ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
The Defendant's Motion to Suppress Illegally Obtained Evidence is Denied.
DATED this

f

day of
BY THE COURT:

